Stock market and investment : the governance role of the market by Samuel, Cherian
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPFR  1578D
Stock Market  '.rer  *i(e  o3
and Investment  @r-'ressicn:;
equLMtv  -Suiabe  poU:,
The Governance Role of the Market  trmoksh4Should  t
deWse. to encouao  i..
*  - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~byZ  ifiSittjo  |al1t1 
Chenian Samuel  O  -
The World Bank


















































































































dPOLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1578
Summary findings
Institutional  investors have become tremendously  the United States, liquidity has been the dominant
important in U.S. capital markets in recent years. But a  objective and "exit"  rather than "voice" has been the
study of 557 U.S. manufacturing  firms (1985-90)  shows  preferred option of institutional investors on corporate
the role of such investors to be mixed. Results show the  governance issues. But recently "voice" has begun to be a
following:  more important objective.
* Institutional ownership has a positive effect on  *  Institutional investors' monitoring  and disciplinary
capital spending but apparently a negative effect on  activities may (through  corporate governance) substitute
research and development spending and no effect on  for the disciplinary and signaling roles of debt. But there
advertising expenditures. So, institutional ownership  is no definite evidence that institutional ownership by
might contribute to a firm's underinvestmcnt in  itself improves firm performance. Still, activism by
intangible assets and hence exacerbate managerial  institutional investors has replaced takeovers as the
myopia.  central mechanism of corporate government in the
* Institutional  investors are complex institutions, so  United States in the  1990s.
the regulatory and investment environment in which  The implication for developing countries:  encourage
they operate must be carefully designed. The  institutional ownership of equity, and promote  activism
institutionalization of the stock market (its domination  among institutional investors.
by institutional investors rather than individuals)  The U.S. experience cannot always be generalized to
happened gradually in the United States and some other  other countries, but it does demonstrate that such
industrial countries and may happen gradually in  activism can be a viable alternative to takeovers as a
developing countries as their financial markets are  vehicle for corporate governance. It is also important for
reformed and deepened.  curbing the excesses of managerial discretion and
There  is a fundamental conflict between liquidity  maximizing shareholder values.
and control as objectives on institutional investment. In
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their comments.Stock Market  and Investment: The Governance Role of the Market
In a market economy, the stock  market performs three basic functions:  (i) a source
for  financing investment; (ii)  a  signalling mechanism to  managers regarding  investment
decisions; and  (iii) a  market for corporate control in  reallocating existing resources  and
promoting managerial and organizational efficiency. Stock market activity also has  other
implications for firms like the role of  shareholder and managerial horizons with regard to
investment decisions of  firms and the consequences of the  steady increase in  institutional
ownership of  equity for corporate govemance, firm's  choices with regard to tangible and
intangible investments etc..
This paper focusses on the govemance  role of the stock market', based on the evidence
for institutional investors for a sample of U.S.  manufacturing  firms, seeking to draw lessons
which would enhance the corporate governance  process in developing  countries.  The paper is
organized into two main sections. Section  I starts with a detailed discussion  of the issues posed
by the rapidly increasing  institutional  ownership  of corporate equity  in the U.S..  Following  this,
the various hypotheses to be tested empirically  are enumerated.  Section  II contains the results




It  is  well-known that the role of  institutional investors has become tremendously
important in the U.S. capital markets in recent years.  From about 15 percent of total financial
' Samuel  (1995a)  deals with the financing  role of the market and Samuel  (1995b)  deals with the
signalling  role of the market.assets in 1970, the share of institutions  has grown to 22 percent in 1992.2 Within the class of
institutional investors, the relative importance, based on their investments,  is as follows: (1)
pension funds; (2) mutual funds; (3) insurance companies; (4) non-pension  bank trusts; and (5)
foundations/endowments.  The consequences  of this increased institutional  equity ownership  on
both the liquidity of the U.S. stock markets and the performance  of U.S. corporations has been
a matter of intense debate among economists.
Critics like Lowenstein (1988), assert that the rapid institutionalization  of the stock
market has adversely affected  the stock market as well as corporations. A common argument
holds that money managers of institutional funds are obsessed with their funds'  quarterly
performance, which results in excessive and myopic trading.  In turn, these trading practices
effectively raise the cost of equity financing.  In addition, Jacobs (1991) suggests that the
growing  importance  of  institutional  investors  in  financial  markets  has  led  to  the
"commoditization"  of corporate ownership and the market for corporate control.
It  has often been asserted that the growing importance of  institutional investors is
responsible for the increased share turnover in the market.  One piece of evidence often cited
to support this argument  is that block trading (trades of 10,000  shares or more) as a percentage
of total trading volume has become  quite high.  Block trading accounted  for 54.5 percent of all
shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange in 1988.3 Lowenstein  (1988) has argued that
since these large block trades are almost exclusively  done by institutions, and since small block
trades (as small as 1,000 shares) are also made largely by institutions, institutions probably
2 See Brancato  (1992) for details.
3 See New  York  Stock  Exchange  Fact  Book,  1989,  p.73.
2account for 75 percent of all trading--substantially  more than the fraction of shares they own.
If one counts the volume of trade in derivative securities--index  futures, options, and
over-the-counter synthetic equities markets--then the increase in effective turnover of stocks
would  be more dramatic  than  the NYSE turnover figures indicate. Lowenstein  (1988) found that
the high turnovers impose  an exorbitant burden (tax) on the funds that are being churned, and
reduced the underlying stream  of income  by about one-sixth. In fact, the annual stock tumover
"tax" roughly equalled the value of the new stocks issued  each year for cash, which of course
is the primary reason for having a stock market.
The high turnover of institutional portfolios is taken as suggestive that they are more
speculative  than are individual  investors.  However, as noted by Shiller (1992), the evidence  is
far from conclusive about the propensity of institutional investors to engage in  speculative
behavior.  There is a common  perception that institutional  investors are subject to an incentive
system  that rewards short-term  returns than are individuals,  many  of whom  have long investmnent
horizons.  However, there does not appear to be any conclusive  evidence that institutional
investors ignore the long-term profitability of the companies they invest in any more than
individual investors when they dominated the trade in the stock market earlier.
Part of the problem is that investment  managers  are evaluated  on too short term a basis-
and are not often not given adequate time to manage  their portfolios well.  As noted by Shiller
(1992), some corporate clients of portfolio managers  reportedly use the 12/24 rule, which is to
fire any portfolio manger whose performance  is 12 percent under  the S&P 500 index for any 24-
month period.
On the other hand, Jones et al. (1990)  argue that the dramatic  increase in trading volume
3that has accompanied  the growth in institutional ownership in U.S.  stock markets during the
1980s has in fact enhanced stock market liquidity, and thereby lowered the required return on
equity and therefore the cost of capital.  Also, institutions, with their large professional  staffs,
are likely to be more efficient than individual investors at collecting, analyzing, and acting on
objective, firm-specific fundamental  information.  Therefore, the increased institutionalization
of the U.S. capital  markets has actually served to improve  the efficiency  with which  corporations
are valued and govemed.  Instead of retarding aggregate long-term corporate investment, the
growth in institutional  equity  ownership simply  may have  redirected capital from firms with less
promising investment  projects towards firms with more profitable investment projects.
Jones et al. (1990) tested these hypotheses  for a sample of 586 U.S. firms for 1982 and
1988.  They conclude that institutions have had a positive effect on liquidity; stocks traded
heavily by institutions experienced rising turnover, declining volatility and narrowing bid-ask
spreads. In other words, institutional  investors helped  in lowering the required return on equity
capital and therefore the cost of capital for the sample  firms.  Also, the analysis of corporate R
and D expenditures  showed no strong evidence that institutions induce short-termist  (myopic)
behavior amongst corporate management.  In  general, the study found no support for the
criticisms often aimed at institutional investors.
These findings are also consistent with those of Jarrel et al. (1985).  The study found
that, holding  industry effects constant, institutional  ownership had a positive effect on the R and
D behavior of  companies, for a  sample of  324 companies for the  1980-83 period.  i.e.,
Institutional investors seem to favor firms with high R and D to revenue ratios.
Likewise, using UK data, Nickell and Wadhwani (1987) found that while the stock
4market attached too high a weight to current dividends--which  is consistent with the belief that
the market is myopic--they  found no evidence to link this myopic behavior with increases in
institutional ownership of equity.  Also, Lakoshinok  et al. (1992) find no solid evidence  for the
hypothesis that institutional investors destabilize  the prices of individual stocks.
As noted by Scholes  (1991), some  of the increase  in share turnover from the early 1980s
and late 1970s is explained  by the increase in the number of cash tender offers and the growth
of share repurchases  and recapitalizations  that started in the early 1980s and grew dramatically
after 1984.
Many pension funds use so-called asset allocation techniques.  If managers feel that
stocks as a group are overvalued relative to bonds, they sell stocks and move into bonds. This
creates turnover, but has little to do with the horizons of corporate investment projects.  In
addition, pension fund managers trade in securities to adjust their holdings of market sectors.
They sell and buy baskets or bundles of these securities to effect their changing  policies.  This
too creates turnover but is decoupled  from a specific  corporation's investment  decision making.
Also, many investment  managers use the futures and options markets to hedge their risks or to
increase their returns by creating synthetic securities. By hedging, they can concentrate  their
holdings in specific  stocks or sectors, which they believe  will increase in value, while reducing
risks (that is, market wide risk that they cannot control).  These futures and options market
trades  create  short-term trading volume that is  again decoupled from specific corporate
investment decisions.
Although a transactions  tax or a capital  gains tax on short-term trading by pension funds
will reduce turnover, it is not clear that it will solve  the long-run corporate investment  problem.
5Some commentators  have argued that, since 1986, U.S.  tax policy has increased the cost of
capital to U.S.  corporations and reduced their investment horizons.  A transactions tax will
reduce liquidity in the stock market.  A liquid securities market increases investor demand for
securities and lowers the corporate cost of capital.  To reduce liquidity through a transactions
tax will increase corporate capital costs, reduce the number of market makers, reduce demand
for trading, and hurt options and futures markets, which rely on more frequent trading to effect
portfolio strategies.
Vishny  (1991) argues that the biggest  effects of a transactions  tax are likely to be felt in
the currently highly liquid markets for such  instruments  as government  bond futures and options
and stock index  futures and options. However, a lot of market participants  use these  instruments
to frequently  rebalance  their portfolios and hedge  risks at low cost and not simply  take zero-sum
bets  against other market participants.  By substantially increasing the cost of trading,  a
transactions  tax would severely restrict this risk management  behavior.
An important  backdrop  to this discussion  is to note that  in practice, institutions  are legally
required to be extremely  diverse and are barred from holding significant  shares  of the ownership
of any one corporation. For instance, the Investment Company Act of 1940, which followed
the collapse of investment trusts,  set minimum  levels of diversification for mutual funds and
precluded  them from holding more than 10 percent of a company's stock. Complaints  about the
self-serving  management  and the underfunding  of corporate pension funds led Congress to pass
the Employee  Retirement  Income Security Act  (ERISA)  in 1974. ERISA  prohibits  pension  plans
from holding more than  10 percent of the sponsor's own stock or 5 percent of  any other
company's stock and specifies conservative  rules for pension fund trustees.
6There is a view in the literature, principally associated with academics from the law
schools, that emphasizes the political forces that shaped the modem American corporation.
Perhaps the best description of this approach can be found in Roe (1994, 1991, 1990).  The
principal plank of the argument is that the Berle/Means corporation, in which ownership and
control are  separated, was not  "an inevitably natural consequence" of  the economic and
technological  forces that shaped modem capitalism, but rather was an adaptation to political
forces that limited scale, scope, and power of financial  institutions. Roe (1991) has suggested
that, in the absence of these politically  imposed constraints, the evolution of the modern U.S.
corporation might have resulted in the emergence of a very different dominant organizational
form, one more nearly resembling the Japanese or German industrial system in which financial
institutions  are the major shareholders  of, and closely monitor, industrial corporations. Black
(1990), Gilson and Kraakman (1991), Grundfest (1990), and Pound (1990)  have also advocated
the overregulation  thesis that the monitoring  capacity of institutional  investors  has been inhibited
by excessive  regulation. Proponents  of the overregulation  hypothesis  have  argued  that Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and banking regulation has hobbled institutional  investors,
resulting in high agency costs, weak capital market discipline, and managerial  entrenchment.
All these new critics tend to favor deregulation  of financial institutions  so that they can serve
as  more effective corporate monitors.  For  many of these critics, the relationship between
financial  institutions  and corporate managements  in the German  and  Japanese  economies  provides
the relevant model.
On the other hand, defenders of corporate management  seem equally convinced that,
unless  their power is checked,  institutional  investors  will soon dominate  corporate managements.
7As a result, they have advanced a very different set of policy proposals, which seek to subject
institutional investors  to  greater  oversight.  Typically,  these  proposals  have  portrayed
institutional investors not as highly constrained and overly regulated entities, but as financial
adolescents, recklessly preoccupied  with short-term profit maximization. One example is the
1989 Report  of  the  New  York State  Task  Force  on  Pension Fund  Investment, which
recommended  that public pension  funds be subjected  to greater legislative  control and guidance.
Another even more ominous signal for institutional investors was the passage in  1990 of a
Pennsylvania  statute under which  institutional  investors could be forced to disgorge their profits
on the sale of a Pennsylvania-chartered  corporation's stock, if they participated in a control
group. Alarmed  by the power  and what they perceive as the short-term mentality  of institutional
investors, Lipton and Rosenblaum (1991) have suggested an even more sweeping change:
abolition of the annual election of directors in  favor of a quinquennial election.  What is
however, common to these polar views of the institutional investors is the assumption that, for
better or  worse, institutional investors would soon dominate corporate managements  in  the
absence of political constraints. 4
However, Coffee (1991) disagrees with this assumption and argues instead that the
primary explanation for institutional  passivity is not overregulation, but the insufficiency of
existing incentives to motivate  institutional  money managers to monitor.  Although  proponents
of institutional activism have analyzed  at length the potential  ability of institutional investors to
hold corporate managers accountable, they have largely ignored the question of who holds
4 It is interesting  to note  that  Jensen  (1989)  and  Roe (1990)  argue  that  the evolution  of leveraged  buy-
out firms constitute  a market response  to legal restrictions  on activist  management  by institutional
investors.
8institutional managers responsible. The problem of agency costs is particularly complicated  in
the case of institutional investors.
In particular, the usual mechanisms  of corporate accountability  are either unavailable  or
largely compromised at the institutional  level.  For instance, while corporate managements  are
subject to the disciplinary  threat of hostile takeovers, proxy fights, and other corporate control
transactions, the management  of most institutional investors are not.  Only in the case of a
closed-end mutual fund is a takeover even conceivable, and actual instances of such takeovers
are virtually unknown. Other forms of capital market discipline  are also lacking with regard to
institutional  investors: while  banks and other creditors  can pressure corporate managements  that
are underperforming, pension funds are immune from similar capital market pressure because
they are creditors, not debtors.  In the case of defined benefit pension plans (but not defined
contribution plans),  the corporate sponsor does have an incentive to remove a substandard
investment manager (in order to reduce the future contribution  it must make), but management
of the corporate sponsor  is itself subject to a conflict  of interest on the issue of whether  it wishes
its pension managers to engage in active shareholder monitoring  of corporate managements.
As noted by Coffee (1991), there may be two other reasons, why agency costs will be
higher at the institutional level than at the corporate management  level.  First, the problem of
collective  action is potentially  more severe at the institutional  investor level than at the corporate
level. Not only are the beneficiaries  of a pension fund as dispersed as the shareholders  in large
corporations, there is no analogue in the pension fund context to the large shareholder in the
public corporation who may be willing to undertake monitoring  and similar expenditures  that
benefit other shareholders. In other words, the free-rider problem associated  with shareholder
9monitoring is much more severe for institutional investors compared to public corporations.
Second, one of the basic techniques in  corporate governance for aligning manageril  and
shareholder  preferences is the use of executive  compensation  devices, such as the stock  option,
that  give  managers an  incentive to  maximize value for  shareholders.  Such  executive
compensation formulas are less used and more difficult to design for institutional  investors.
In other words, the critics appear to have overstated  the importance of overregulation.
Consequently,  deregulation  alone is not an adequate  policy  response.  Coffee (1991) argues that
other factors like conflicts of interest, a preference for liquidity, and collective action deserve
greater weight  in any theory of institutional  investor behavior. In particular, there exists  a trade-
off between liquidity and control.  Investors that want liquidity may hesitate to accept control.
Therefore Coffee (1991) proposes that there are three distinctive hypotheses that can
explain the passivity  of institutional  investors: (1) an "interest  group" story (Roe and others) that
views regulation as chilling institutional investor participation  in corporate governance as the
product of  low-visibility political coalitions between management and other groups; (2) a
collective action story (based on Olson (1971), Rock (1991)) that views the cost of organizing
dispersed  investors to  be  sufficiently high  as  to  make them  rationally apathetic about
participation in corporate governance;  and (3) a public interest story suggesting  that regarding
legislation and administrative  rules, the public has long resisted the union of liquidity and
control.  The last two approaches  have received less attention compared to the first approach,
since  economic  theorists, ever wary of regulation, have tended  to view the regulation  of financial
institutions as intended to entrench corporate managements.
10Hypotheses  to be tested
There are a number of interesting hypotheses  that can be tested with regard to the role
of institutional investors. The most obvious hypothesis  perhaps is to test whether institutional
ownership is detrimental  to long-term investments. In other words, does institutional  ownership
put too much capital market pressure on the firm and does it force the firm to forgo long-term
investments. This is therefore closely related to the issue of whether shareholder myopia  leads
to managerial myopia or not. 5
This hypothesis  can be tested in a univariate framework  by dividing the firms into two
classes on the basis of the median values of institutional  ownership  and comparing  the values of
tangible and intangible  investments for the two sets of firms.  If institutional ownership has a
detrimental effect on investment  behavior, firms with high levels of institutional  ownership  can
be expected to have low levels of tangible and intangible investments and vice versa.  The
reverse evidence would indicate that institutional  ownership has a positive effect on the firm's
investments.
In addition, institutional  ownership can be used as an additional  right hand side variable
in  a  standard regression of  capital expenditures, R  and D  expenditures, and  advertising
expenditures. The other right hand side variables in these regressions are cash flow, sales and
the Q ratio. 6 If institutional  ownership has a detrimental  effect  on investment  behavior, it would
5 Shareholder myopia means the tendency of shareholders  to focus on the behavior of stock prices
in the short term as opposed  to the long term.  Likewise,  managerial  myopia implies  managerial  behavior
focussed  on improving earnings  in the short term at the expense  of long term growth; for instance, by
way of skimping on R and D and maintenance  expenditures  that would eventually  prove to be perilous
to the firm's long term prospects.
6 Q ratio (Tobin's Q) is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement  cost of its assets.
11have a negative coefficient  in these regressions. On the other hand, a positive coefficient  would
indicate that institutional  ownership has a positive effect on the firm's investments.
The next issue is whether institutional  ownership  matters for performance. So far, there
is no empirical evidence to show that institutional  control matters for profitability. McConnell
and Servaes (1990) found that firms with high institutional ownership have high Q ratios.
However, this relationship  could also imply that institutional  investors invest in firms with high
Tobin's Q, rather than the other way around where their presence causes the firm to have a
higher Tobin's Q.  Also, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no correlation between accounting
profitability and institutional  ownership.
This hypothesis  can be tested in a univariate  framework by dividing the sample  of firms
on the basis of the median values of institutional  ownership and comparing rates of returns for
the two classes of firms.  If institutional  ownership has a positive effect on performance, firms
with high institutional  ownership can be expected  to have  higher rates of returns than firms with
low institutional ownership.
The relationship between institutional ownership and performance can be tested in a
multivariate  framework  as well by including  institutional  ownership as a right hand side variable
in  standard return on investment regressions.  The other variables in these regressions are
financial slack, internal finance, net long-term debt, and net issue of equity.  If institutional
ownership has a  favorable impact on performance, it should have a positive sign in these
regressions.
A related hypothesis  that can be investigated  is whether institutional  ownership  reduces
information problems and  agency costs  between the firm  and  its  outside investors.  If
12institutional ownership reduces information  problefns-and  Agency  costs, internal finance should
have a lesser role in the capital expenditure  decisions of firms with high levels of institutional
ownership compared to firms with low levels of institutional ownership. 7
This hypothesis can be tested in a multivariate framework by dividing firms into two
categories based on the median values of institutional  ownership and running standard capital
expenditure  regressions for firms with high and low levels of institutional  ownership. If it is that
institutional ownership reduces information problems and agency costs, the cash flow term
should be smaller for firms with high institutional  ownership than firms with low institutional
ownership in these regressions.
The other interesting hypothesis  associated  with institutional ownership  is whether it can
act as an alternate source of capital market discipline, similar to the role played by debt and
take-overs.  To the extent that the disciplinary  pressures of active institutional  ownership and
debt financing  are substitutes, higher degree of institutional  ownership  would be associated  with
less debt in capital structures, holding other things  constant. In contrast, if corporate discipline
can be produced  more efficiently  through  eliciting  higher debt ratios, institutional  investors may
exercise their market influence  by attaching  higher  valuations  to firms that  validate the existence
of managerial  discipline by using a higher degree of debt.
This hypothesis can be tested in a univariate framework by dividing the sample on the
basis of median values of institutional ownership  and comparing the debt-equity ratios for the
two sets of firms. If institutional ownership  and debt financing  are substitutes, firms with high
'  See Samuel  (1995a)  for a more detailed  discussion  of the relationship  between  information
problems,  agency  costs, and internal  finance.
13institutional ownership can be expected to have lower debt-equity ratios than firms with low
institutional  ownership. If institutional  ownership  and debt financing are complements  instead,
firms with high institutional ownership can be expected to have higher debt-equity ratios than
firms with low institutional ownership.
Alternatively, institutional ownership can be added as an additional right hand side
variable in a standard leverage regression. The other right hand side variables in this regression
are size, assets, profits, and the Q ratio.  If institutional ownership and debt financing are
substitutes, the institutional ownership variable can be expected to have a negative sign and if
the two are complements, the sign is expected  to be positive. The expected signs for the other
independent  variables in the regression are assets (+),  size (+/-),  profits (+1-), and Q (+).
Rajan and Zingales (1994) refers to  the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets as  the
tangibility  of assets.  If a large fraction of a firm's assets are tangible, then assets should serve
as collateral, diminishing the risk of the lender suffering the agency costs of debt (like risk
shifting).  They should also retain more value in  liquidation.  Therefore, the greater the
proportion of tangible  assets on the balance  sheet (ratio of fixed assets to total assets), the more
willing lenders should be to supply loans, and leverage should be higher.
The effect of size on equilibrium  leverage is more ambiguous. Larger firms tend to be
more diversified and fail less often,  so size (log of  sales) may be an inverse proxy for
bankruptcy. If so, size should have a positive  impact  on the supply of debt. However, size may
also be a  proxy for  the  information outside investors have,  which should increase their
preference for equity relative to debt.  Also, the largest firms are more immune to takeover
pressures so they are less likely to be forced to take on debt as a commitment  to pay out cash
14or refrain from negative NPV projects.
There are also conflicting  predictions  on the effects of profitability  on leverage. Myers
and Majluff (1984) predict a negative relationship, because firms will prefer to finance with
internal funds rather than debt.  Jensen (1986)  predicts a positive relationship  if the market for
corporate control is effective and forces firms to commit to paying out cash by levering up.
However, if the market for corporate control is ineffective, managers  of profitable firms prefer
to avoid the disciplinary role of debt, which would lead to a negative correlation between
profitability  and debt.  On the supply  side, suppliers  should  be more willing  to lend to firms with
current  cash flow.
The Q coefficient  could be viewed  as a proxy for the growth  prospects  of the firm as well
as conveying information  about the worth of the company. For instance, Baumol (1965) notes
that the performance of the firm's shares influence  the terms on which it can obtain funds from
other sources.  In particular, lenders are likely to base their risk estimates, and hence their
interest terms, in part on the market's evaluation  of the company's stocks. Likewise, Morck et
al.  (1990) argue  that since the  stock market conveys information about the  worth of  the
company, lenders could use this information  to decide how much to lend and on what terms.
15-H-
Results
The data on institutional  ownership  is based on the Spectrum  3 reports  compiled  by CDA
Technologies. This data in turn is based on the 13F filings furnished by institutional investors
with the SEC every quarter and includes all institutions with investment control over $100
million.  The data used here refers to the last quarter of the year; i.e.,  as of December 31st.
The data on all other variables are taken from Standard & Poor's  COMPUSTAT database.
Overall, the data refers to 557 U.S. manufacturing  firms for the 1985-90  period. Table 1 shows
the increasing institutionalization  of the stock market during this time.
When the effect of institutional ownership on tangible and intangible investments is
conducted  in a univariate framework by dividing the sample on the basis of the median values
of institutional  ownership, capital  expenditures  and R and D expenditures  are found to be higher
for firms with high levels of institutional  ownership than firms with low levels of institutional
ownership (table 2).  This is reversed in the case of advertising expenditures.  On balance
therefore, institutional ownership does not appear to be detrimental to the firm's  long-term
investments.  Overall, institutional ownership seems to have a positive effect on the firm's
investment behavior.  It is also interesting to note that these results are consistent with the
findings of Jones et al. (1990) in that institutional ownership does not seem to induce short-
termist behavior amongst corporate management.
Tables 3 and 4 show the details of institutional ownership in various industry groups.
In general, the distribution  of institutional  ownership across industries  appear random and is not
significantly  different across high tech and low tech industries, when the analysis is conducted
16in a univariate framework.  In other words, there is no evidence from univariate analysis to
suggest that institutional investors shun high tech stocks.
It is also interesting to note from table 2 that the share turnover ratio for firms with high
institutional ownership is significantly  higher than the share turnover ratio for firms with low
institutional  ownership. This is consistent  with the notion that institutional  investors tend to be
very  active traders of their investment portfolios.  If the share turnover ratio is driven by
liquidity considerations, this evidence supports the hypothesis  advocated  by Coffee (1991) and
others that liquidity rather than control is the primary investment objective of institutional
investors.  Also, this finding of firms with high institutional ownership having high share
turnover ratios is incongruent with the belief in the literature that larger equity stakes tend to
make institutional investors less liquid.  Finally, this positive relationship  between institutional
ownership and share turnover ratio suggests that the growing institutionalization  of the stock
market has also contributed to the steady increase in the share turnover ratio.
The  evidence with regard to  the effect of institutional ownership on  investment is
somewhat  mixed when it comes to the regressions that incorporates fixed firm and year effects
(tables  5, 6, 7).8 In capital  expenditure  regressions, the institutional  ownership effect  is positive.
The higher the level of institutional  ownership, the greater the level of capital expenditures. In
advertising regressions, institutional ownership has no effect.  In the R and D regressions
however, the institutional ownership variable  turns out to be negative and significant  in two of
In general, the relationship  is specified as
Y. = 80 + 13.Xi,  +  ai + v, + e.  where ai is the individual  firm effect and v, is the year
effect. The standard approach  for sweeping  out fixed effects,  by transforming  variables  to deviations  from
their firm-specific  means,  has been used in this paper. These estimates  are also referred to as the "within-
group" estimate in the literature. See Hsiao (1986) for a more detailed discussion  of this approach.
17the four specifications. It is insignificant  in the other two R and D regressions.  In this instance
therefore, it does turn out that institutional ownership has a detrimental effect on the R and D
expenditures of firms.  This result also implies that institutional ownership contributes to the
firm's  underinvestment  in R and D expenditures and therefore managerial myopia.  In this
regard, these results are contrary to the evidence in Jarrel et al.  (1985) that was based on a
sample of 324 companies  for the 1980-83  period.  Given that the results presented here are for
the 1985-90 period, it could well be that these conflicting results are due to the different time-
periods involved.
As noted elsewhere, it is the case that the results from the multivariate  analysis are more
reliable than the results from the univariate analysis in that the latter incorporates a broader set
of factors including fixed firm and year effects.  Therefore, the evidence from here can be
summarized  as saying that institutional  ownership has a positive effect on capital expenditures,
negative effect on R and D expenditures,  and no effect on advertising expenditures.
In order to study the effect  of institutional  ownership  on firm  performance  in a univariate
framework, firms were divided on the basis of median value of institutional  ownership and the
returns on investment  were compared  (table 8).  In all instances, the returns are not significantly
different across the two classes of firms and therefore implies that institutional  ownership has
no implications for performance.  This finding is therefore consistent with the evidence of
Demsetz and Lehn (1985)  in that institutional  ownership is unrelated  to accounting  profits.  On
the other hand, the evidence in table 2 does show that firms with high institutional ownership
tend to have high Q ratios compared to firms with low institutional  ownership. This finding is
consistent with the results of McConnell and Servaes (1990), though, as noted before, the
18direction of causality is not clear.
The relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance was also tested
in a multivariate  framework  by running standard  return on investment  regressions. These results
are shown in table 9.  These regressions also include fixed firm and year effects.  In all the
regressions, the institutional ownership variable is insignificant  and therefore reinforces the
finding from the univariate analysis that institutional ownership  has no implications for return
on investment and therefore firm performance. All other variables in these regressions  have the
expected signs.
The relationship  between institutional ownership and the Q ratio was explored in some
detail (table 10).  As shown in the table, these results are somewhat similar to the nonlinear
relationship that Morck et al. (1988) found between insider ownership and the Q ratio.  Q ratio
rises with institutional ownership,  before falling when the ownership rises above the 50 percent
mark.
Table 11 summarizes the results of the capital expenditure  regressions with fixed firm
and year effects that explore the role of institutional  ownership  in reducing  information  problems
and agency costs between the firm and outside investors.  Given that the cash flow term is
identical for firms with high and low levels of institutional  ownership, there is no support for
the hypothesis that institutional ownership reduces information problems and agency costs.
These results therefore  bolster the earlier finding  that institutional  ownership has no implications
for firm performance.
When the capital market discipline  role of institutional  ownership was investigated  in  a
univariate framework by dividing  the sample  on the basis of median  institutional  ownership, the
19leverage ratios were not found to be significantly  different  across the two groups of firms with
high and low levels of institutional  ownership (table 12). In a multivariate  framework however,
the institutional ownership variable turns out to be negative and significant in the leverage
regressions (table 13). In other words, firms are characterized  by lower degrees of debt in their
capital structures with high levels of institutional ownership. This supports the hypothesis  that
institutional  ownership  and debt financing  are substitutes. This also suggests  that the monitoring
and disciplinary  activities of institutional investors, via the corporate governance  process, may
function as a substitute  for the disciplinary  and signalling  roles of debt. This result also  provides
a rationale for the increasing  activism of institutional  investors  in corporate governance  issues,
especially public pension funds like CalPERS and College  Retirement Equities Fund (CREF).
More generally, this finding is consistent with the view that institutional activism has replaced
takeovers as the central mechanism  of corporate governance  in the 1990s. However, it should
be pointed out that the results presented here show no evidence  that the increasing  activism of
institutional investors in the corporate governance  process has improved firm performance in
practice.
Conclusions and Discussion
The evidence regarding the role of institutional investors is mixed.  While institutional
ownership has a positive effect on capital expenditures, it appears to have a negative effect on
R and D expenditures and no  effect on advertising expenditures.  Therefore, institutional
ownership can also be considered as contributing to the firm's underinvestment  in intangible
assets.  The results also suggest that the monitoring and disciplinary  activities of institutional
investors, via the corporate  governance  process, may function  as a substitute  for the disciplinary
20and signalling roles of debt.  However, there is n6 definite evidence to show that institutional
ownership improves firm performance per se.
What then are  the implications of  this evidence regarding the  role of institutional
investors in corporate governance in  the U.S.  for other countries, especially the developing
countries?  The discussion and empirical evidence in this paper seems to  suggest that the
fundamental  reason for institutional  passivity in corporate governance affairs is rational  apathy
rather than political and legal constraints.  As shown by  Coffee (1991), this conclusion is
reaffirmed when the experience of other countries is taken into account. For instance,  the five
percent limitation on voting stock ownership is not unique to U.S.  banks; similar regulation
exists in Japan as well as other economies.
Also, in other economies--for example, Germany and the UK--in which substantive
limitations on bank ownership of securities have not existed, financial institutions  still have not
exceeded the five percent level.  Perhaps the need to diversify investments limit banks in these
countries, or perhaps other factors--such  as the need for liquidity, possible conflicts  of interest,
or fear of business  or political  reprisals--cause  them to halt  ownership of voting stock  at this low
level.  Alternatively, banks may not view equity ownership as a business at which they have a
comparative advantage.
Even within the United States, banks have not exploited  the statutory  powers they  possess
to  own  and hold  securities--possibly because they have not found such ownership to  be
profitable. Although  non-banking  activities of banks were virtually unregulated  until the  passage
of the bank Holding Company Act of 1956, banks made little use of these powers.  After the
Act's passage, real constraints were placed on the ability of bank holding companies  to make
21acquisitions,  but even the substantial powers that remain are not exploited.  In any event,  it is
difficult  to  assign  a  causal  relationship  to  legal  restrictions  on  ownership  when  American
financial institutions  historically  have not  used,  and today  continue  to resist  from  using,  the
considerable discretion  that the law gives them.
Therefore,  the fact of institutional  investor passivity  stemming  from rational apathy in
the case of the U.S.  could imply a  similar conclusion in other  settings too.  Having  said this,
it should be  noted that  the behavior  of institutional  investors  in the public sector,  say  public
pension  funds, could well vary  in other settings, especially  developing economies.
In this regard,  India offers an interesting example.  The major institutional investors  in
India--Unit Trust of India (UTI), insurance companies and development banks9--all belong to the
public sector.  Over the years,  these institutional investors  have become important owners of
equity in the Indian corporate  sector, in part due to the legal provision that enables institutional
investors to convert long-term borrowings to equity holdings at favorable terms.'°  Consequently,
institutional investors  have become important holders of corporate  equity and critical players in
the Indian market for corporate  control.  In some of the heated takeover contests of the past,  it
would  seem  that  institutional  investors  were  guided  more  by  political  considerations  than
9  Industrial Development  Bank of India (IDBI), Industrial Financial Corporation of India (IFCI),
Industrial  Credit  and Investment  Corporation  of India  (ICICI), and Industrial  Reconstruction  bank of India
(IRBI) are the main development  banks in India that provide long-term finance to the Indian corporate
sector.
10 Very broad estimates  of the stock-holding  pattern are as follows: Controlling management/family:
25-30  percent;  institutions  (development  banks, UTI, life insurance  companies  etc.): 35-45  percent;  public
(free float): 35-40 percent.  See George (1994).
22maximization  of  shareholder  value."  Therefore,  in  a  developing  country  setting  where
institutional investors are part of the public sector, political constraints--albeit of a different  sort
than  the  one  discussed  in  the  U.S.  case--may  be  important  with  regard  to  the  role  that
institutional investors play in corporate  governance issues.  Having said this, it should be noted
that except for some infrequent forays into the market for corporate control, institutional investor
activism  in  India  is  practically  non-existent;  more  often  than  not,  they vote  with  existing
management and show no particular  concern about the performance  of a given firm in relation
to the overall  market and the industry.
Without doubt,  no other developed or developing country approximates anywhere close
to the U.S.  market  for corporate  control,  especially  with regard  to hostile takeovers.  Many
commentators  have argued that institutional investors played  an important role in the takeover
battles of the 1980s and led to the "commoditization"  of the market for corporate  control.'2
The other interesting example of institutional  investors  in a developing country  setting
comes from Chile.  Chile reformed its social security system in May 1981, from a social pension
system to a private  system of personal pension  plans.  It replaced an insolvent  social pension
system that operated  on a "pay-as-you-go"  basis with a fully-funded pension system based  on
Perhaps the best known of these is the Escorts company case from the 1980s which pitted the
family ownership against a  Non-resident  Indian business group, with the controlling share held by
institutional  investors. Likewise, institutional  investors were key players in the battle for the control of
Larsen & Toubro company  between  the incumbent  professional  management  and another  Indian  business
group.  More recently, institutional investors also played a critical role in the tussle between the Indian
CEO and the parent management  of ITC company--a  subsidiary of a British multinational.
12 See  Jacobs  (1991)  for instance.
23individual capitalization accounts.  It is essentially a defined contribution system" 3 based on
individual  capitalization  accounts,  where  pension  benefits depend  on the contributions  made over
a person's working life and the investment  income earned on accumulated  balances. While the
system is government mandated and regulated, it is managed completely  private by a number
of  authorized pension management companies, known as  Administradoras de  Fondos de
Pensiones or AFPs." 4 These pension funds played a significant  role in the privatization of the
state-owned  enterprises in the second  half of the 1980s. Over the first ten years of its operation,
the investments  of the AFP system  have  been insulated from the vicissitudes  of financial  markets
by the strict investment rules that limited  exposure to corporate equities. However, investment
rules have been relaxed since to allow grater allocation  of funds into corporate equities.  Also,
AFPs have been allowed to invest in foreign securities recently.
As noted by Vittas and Iglesias (1992), the contribution of AFPs to the dispersion of
corporate ownership has been rather limited, mainly because of the unwillingness of Chilean
corporations to accept a dilution of control.  Likewise, the role of pension funds in corporate
governance  is limited to privatized utilities and practically nonexistent  at the moment. In part,
this is due to the general fact that in countries  where pension funds invest mnostly  in bonds and
other debt instruments, their role in corporate governance is limited to creditor involvement
when firms face financial  difficulties  and are unable to meet the repayment  conditions  and other
covenants  of bond issues.  However, the role of Chilean  pension funds in corporate governance
" Historically,  company  pension  schemes  have been  defined  benefit  plans, conceived  initially  as
personnel  management  tools  to attract  skilled  workers,  reward  loyalty,  and  facilitate  retirement  of older
workers. See  Hannah  (1986)  for a detailed  description  of the UK and Williamson  (1992)  for the US.
14  See  Vittas  and Iglesias  (1992)  for a more  detailed  description  of the Chilean  pension  reform.
24issues is likely to increase in the future, given that their ownership  of corporate equity is likely
to increase.
It is also interesting to consider the role of pension funds in corporate governance  in the
transitional  economies  briefly. 15 The fundamental  challenge  facing  transitional  economies  today
is enterprise restructuring.  In these economies, it is unlikely  that large private pension funds
will emerge and become important players in the capital markets unless the public pension
systems in these countries are restructured and downsized. In the interregnum, the burden of
enterprise restructuring and the leading  role in corporate governance  is likely to fall on the state,
banks, investment funds, managers and workers (in some instances, foreign companies and
individual investors) who are likely to be the major owners of large corporations.
Policymakers in developing  countries could certainly  benefit from the lessons gleaned
from  institutional  investors  in  the  U.S.,  even  though  capital  markets  are  relatively
underdeveloped in most developing  countries compared to the U.S..  For sure, the picture is
changing  given the current boom in emerging markets, thanks to deregulation  and other policy
reforms in the developing world and the emergence of international  portfolio investors.
This paper suggests  that institutional  investors are complex  institutions, so that care must
be taken while designing  the regulatory  and investment  environment  in which they  operate. This
study also suggests that the institutionalization--the  progression  from individual to institutional
investor domination--of the stock market that has taken place in the U.S.  and some other
developed  countries is a natural, gradual  process that developing  countries  will have to deal with
15 See Vittas and Michelitsch  (1995)  for a discussion  of the role of pension  funds in corporate
governance  in Central  Europe  and  Russia.
25in the future as their financial markets get reformed and deepened. The evidence presented in
this paper suggests that there is a fundamental conflict between liquidity and control as the
primary investment objective of institutional investors.  In the case of the U.S., liquidity has
proved to be the dominant  investment  objective  and has led to the mergence  of 'exit'  rather than
"voice" as the preferred option for institutional investors with regard to corporate governance
issues.  16
However, this scenario has been changing  recently with "voice" beginning to become a
more important objective for institutional  investois with regard to corporate governance  issues.
This sort of institutional  investor activism  has taken on many forms, including  Board shake-ups,
proxy initiatives, "relationship  investing",  progress report on underperforming  companies  etc..17
Even  though the evidence presented in  this paper  suggests that institutional ownership is
unrelated to firm performance, it does seem that institutional investor activism has replaced
takeovers as the central mechanism  of corporate govemance in the U.S. in the 1990s. 1'
If this finding is combined  with the evidence  that the market for corporate control is not
efficient and does not necessarily maximize shareholder value, the implication for developing
countries appears to be to encourage  institutional  ownership of equity and undertake measures
The "exit-voice"  paradigm  is originally  due  to Hirschman  (1970).
17 The fight for good governance  in the U.S. has been spearheaded  by public pension  funds, in
particular  the California  Public Employees  Retirement  System  (CALPERs)  and College  Retirement
Equities  Fund (CREF). There are also organizations  like the Investor  Responsibility  Research  Center
(IRRC)  and  Institutional  Shareholder  Services  (ISS)  that  specialize  in the  monitoring  corporate  governance
practices  of large corporations.
" In part, this lack  of relationship  between  institutional  ownership  and  firm  performance  may  be due
to the fact  that the data used  in this study  stops at 1990. Recent  developments  suggest  a growing  role
by institutional  investors  in board  room  shake-ups  in leading  U.S. corporations  like General  Motors,
IBM,  Westinghouse,  K-Mart  etc..
26that would promote institutional  investor activism." 9
The evidence in this paper also suggests that institutional ownership  has a positive effect
on capital expenditures,  negative effect  on R and D expenditures,  and no effect on advertising
expenditures.  To the extent that institutional ownership contributes to the firm's  underinvestment
in R and D expenditures,  it does play a role in exacerbating managerial myopia.  This is a rather
worrisome  prospect  for developing countries,  since market undervaluation  of high tech firms
could be detrimental to their goal of enhancing technological capabilities. 20 One alternative for
developing  countries  is  to come up  with  initiatives  like venture  capital  to  support  high tech
enterprises.
The evidence with regard to the capital market discipline role of institutional ownership
suggests  that  institutional  ownership  and  debt  financing  are  substitutes.  Consequently,  the
monitoring  and disciplinary  activities  of  institutional  investors,  via the corporate  governance
process,  may function  as a  substitute  for  the disciplinary and  signalling  role  of  debt.  This
finding has  some interesting implications  for  developing countries.  This  is because  firms  in
developing  countries  tend to have more debt in  their capital structures  compared  to firms  in
developed countries. 21 Given that institutional ownership and debt financing are substitutes, the
19 The discussion on the causes and consequences  of takeovers is controversial and inconclusive.
While Manne (1965), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Jensen and Ruback (1980), and others
have argued  that the market for corporate control promotes  efficiency  and enhances  shareholder  wealth,
Mueller (1986, 1987), Ravenscraft  and Scherer (1987), and others have disputed  these claims and have
argued that takeovers are more likely to destroy firm value.
I  Market undervaluation  of high tech firms also stems the fact that since R and D is treated as an
expenditure  and not as an investment,  it has an adverse effect on firm earnings which in turn leads to a
negative market reaction.
21 See Samuel (1995c) for a comparison  of Indian and U.S. firms.  Based on an analysis of sources
and uses of funds, the study finds that internal finance played a greater role for U.S. firms than Indian
27implication is that an increasing institutionalization  of the stock market in developing countries
would have favorable implications  for the corporate governance  process  in these countries.
In conclusion,  policymakers all over the world have to confront  the issue of increasing
institutional  ownership of corporate  equity  sooner or pater.  Suitable policy frameworks  need
to be devised to encourage institutional investor activism.  A key element in this process would
be  to enhance  communication amongst institutional  investors  so as  to overcome  the free-rider
problem  associated with shareholder  monitoring.  Ihe  U.S.  experience  cannot be generalized
to other countries  in every instance,  but it does demonstrate that institutional  investor activism
can be a viable alternative to takeovers with regard to corporate governance issues.  This in turn
is important  to curb the excesses of managerial  discretion and maximize shareholder  value.
firms so that external finance played a greater role for Indian firms than U.S. firms.  Within external
finance, the contribution  of external equity was found to be similar for Indian and U.S. firms; however,
external debt played a much more important role for Indian firms than U.S. firms.
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32Table 1: Trends in institutional  ownership
Institutional ownership  NT
1985  0.356  548
1986  0.379  554
1987  0.402  557
1988  0.406  557
1989  0.413  555
1990  0.417  558
All Years  0.395  3329
Note: Institutional  ownership is the ratio of value of shares held by institutional  investors to the
total value of shares outstanding.
33Table 2: listitutional ownership  and investments
High institutional  Low institutional
ownership  ownership
Share turnover ratio  0.85*  0.54
Capital  0.11*  0.10*
expenditures/Replacement
cost
Q ratio  2.31*  2.08
Capital expenditures/Sales  0.07*  0.06
Advertising/Sales  0.03*  0.04
Advertising/Replacement
cost  0.06*  0.09
R and D/Sales  0.05*  0.03
R and D/Replacement  cost  0.08*  0.07
NT  [477  454
Note: Share turnover ratio is the ratio of number of shares traded to the number of shares
outstanding.
*  indicates that the ratios are significantly  different at the 1% level.
34Table 3: Institutional  ownership by industry
SIC  Industry  Institutional  NT
Code  ownership
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.315  167
21  Tobacco  Products  0.403  6
22  Textile  Mill Products  0.290  72
23  Apparel and Other Textile
Products  0.337  48
24  Lumber  and Wood Products  0.273  42
25  Furniture  and Fixtures  0.296  42
26  Paper  and Allied Products  0.453  132
27  Printing and Publishing  0.422  185
28  Chemicals and Allied products  0.447  336
29  Petroleum  and Coal Products  0.416  144
30  Rubber  and Misc.  Plastic Products  0.374  114
31  Leather  and Leather Products  0.287  47
32  Stone,  Clay, and Glass Products  0.393  47
33  Primary  Metal Industries  0.398  186
34  Fabricated  Metal Products  0.349  220
35  Industrial  Machinery and
Equipment  0.431  436
36  Electronic  & Other Electrical
Equipment  0.386  329
37  Transportation  Equipment  0.423  212
38  Instruments  and Related Products  0.384  264
39  Miscellaneous  Manufacturing
Industries  0.341  54
20-39  All Manufacturing  0.395  3329
Note: Based on the Standard Industrial  Classification  (SIC) code.
Institutional ownership  is the ratio of value of shares held by institutional investors  to the total
value of shares outstanding.
35Table 4: Institutional  ownership by industry
Industry  Institutional  ownership  NT
Chemicals  0.423  420
Pharmaceuticals  0.431  174
Electrical  0.390  388
Computers  0.399  221
Machinery  0.404  847
Miscellaneous  0.361  926
High-tech Industries  0.402  783
Low-tech Industries  0.390  2193
All Industries  0.395  3329
Note:  Based  on  the  industrial  classification  in  Hall  (1993).  The  details  are  as  follows.
Chemicals-SIC  28 (excl. 283,284),  SIC 29,  30; Pharmaceuticals and Medical Instruments-SIC
283, 284, 384; Electrical-SIC 36 (excl. 365-367),  SIC 38 (excl. 384); Computers-SIC  357, 365-
367; Machinery-SIC 33-35 (excl. 357), SIC 37 (excl. 372, 376); Miscellaneous-SIC  20-27, 31,
32,  39.
High-tech:  Electrical,  Computers, and Pharmaceuticals.  Low-tech:  Chemical,  Machinery,  and
Miscellaneous.
Institutional ownership  is the ratio of value of shares held by institutional investors  to the total
value of shares outstanding.
36Table 5: Institutional  ownership  regressions:  Capital expenditures
I __________________  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iV)
Cash flow  0.048(3.18)  0.022(1.58)  0.016(1.38)  0.026(2.13)
Sales  -0.030(-7.15)  -0.053(-13.35)  -0.041(-14.14)  -0.016(-5.12)
Q  0.003(2.35)  -0.003(-1.86)  0.006(4.50)  0.007(4.64)
Institutional
ownership  0.045(4.02)  0.031(2.89)  0.038(3.58)  0.048(4.26)
NT  3329  3329  3329  3329
Adjusted r2 0.025  0.053  0.061  0.017
Notes: Institutional  ownership  is the ratio of value of shares held  by institutional  investors to the
value of shares outstanding.
(i) cash flow and sales divided by total assets, capital expenditures  divided by replacement  cost
of assets; (ii) cash flow and sales divided by total assets, capital  expenditures  divided by sales;
(iii) cash flow and sales divided by replacement  cost of assets, capital expenditures divided by
sales; (iv) cash flow and sales  divided by replacement  cost of assets, capital expenditures  divided
by replacement costs.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
37Table 6: Institutional  ownership  regressions:  Advertising  expenditures
(i)  (1)  (iin)  (iv)
Cash flow  -0.027(-2.05)  -0.004(-0.92)  -0.012(-3.50)  -0.064(-7.12)
Sales  0.009(2.22)  -0.005(-3.70)  -0.006(-6.20)  0.046(18.25)
Q  0.008(7.26)  -0.001(-1.53)  0.001(2.13)  0.003(3.40)
Institutional
ownership  0.011(1.04)  -0.003(-0.82)  -0.002(-0.46)  0.008(0.93)
NT  1421  1421  1421  1421
Adjusted r2 0.038  0.008  0.004  0.221
Notes: Institutional  ownership  is the ratio of value of shares  held by institutional  investors to the
value of shares outstanding.
(i) cash flow and sales divided by total assets, advertising  expenditures  divided by replacement
cost of assets; (ii) cash flow and sales divided by total assets, advertising expenditures  divided
by sales; (iii) cash flow and sales divided by replacement  cost of assets, advertising expenditures
divided by sales; (iv) cash flow and sales divided by replacement  cost of assets, advertising
expenditures  divided by replacement  costs.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
38Table 7: Institutional ownership  regressions:  R and D expenditures
(i)  (i)  (iii)_(iv)
Cash flow  -0.012(-1.93)  -0.016(-5.27)  -0.018(-7.02)  -0.008(-1.71)
Sales  0.003(1.69)  -0.006(-6.13)  -0.002(-3.17)  0.027(18.75)
Q  0.004(7.10)  -0.001(-1.91)  0.001(2.21)  0.0003(0.57)
Institutional
ownership  -0.011(-2.41)  -0.002(-0.70)  -0.001(-0.50)  -0.014(-3.09)
NT  2111  2111  2111  2111
Adjusted r2 0.025  0.052  0.052  0.166
Notes: Institutional ownership is the ratio of value of shares held by institutional investors to the
value of shares outstanding.
(i) cash flow and sales divided  by total assets, R and D expenditures  divided by replacement  cost
of assets; (ii) cash flow  and sales divided  by total assets, R and D expenditures  divided  by sales;
(iii) cash flow and sales divided by replacement  cost of assets, R and D expenditures  divided  by
sales; (iv) cash flow and sales divided by replacement  cost of assets, R and D expenditures
divided by replacement  costs.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
39Table 8: Institutional  ownership  and return on investment
High institutional  Low institutional
ownership  ownership
Return  on equity  0.149  0.157
Return on assets  0.075  0.079
Return on sales  0.054  0.064
Accounting  return I  0.056  0.059
Accounting return II  0.062  0.071
NT  276  281
Note: Accounting  return I is the total returns before tax to debt and equity (interest payments
plus earnings on equity divided by the value of debt plus equity); in this measure the market
value of debt and equity are used.  Accounting  return II is similar to return I, except that the
book value of debt and equity rather than the market  value of equity  are used.  These two return
measures are based on Ando and Auerbach (1988, 1990).
40Table 9: Institutional ownership  and return on investment
Return on  Return on  Return on  Q
equity  assets  sales
(a)  0.152(2.48)  0.045(1.97)  0.169(5.27)  -0.069(-0.08)
(b)  2.316(24.01)  1.170(32.38)  1.051(20.87)  3.910(2.87)
(c)  0.188(7.14)  -0.042(4.26)  0.045(3.25)  -0.251(-0.67)
(d)  - -0.378(-9.59)  0.034(2.32)  0.080(3.90)  -1.048(-1.88)
(e)  0.003(0.22)  0.004(0.36)  0.007(0.96)  -0.252(-1.23)
Adjusted  .i  0.511  0.627  0.450  0.016
|  NT  |1159  11159  11159  1159
Notes: (a) is the ratio of financial slack  (internal finance minus capital expenditures)  to total
assets; (b) is the ratio of internal finance to total assets; (c) is the ratio of net long-term debt
issued to total assets; (d) is the ratio of net equity issued to total assets; and (e) is the percent
of institutional ownership.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
41Table  10: Institutional ownership and Q ratio
Institutional
ownership  Average Q  Standard deviation  NT
0-0.1  1.47  1.61  254
0.1-0.2  1.46  1.28  422
0.2-0.3  1.61  1.45  452
0.3-0.4  1.72  1.39  547
0.4-0.5  2.16  2.14  606
0.5-0.6  2.02  1.61  507
0.6-0.7  1.95  1.26  406
0.7-0.8  1.79  1.28  128
0.8-0.9  1.95  0.81  7
Note: Institutional ownership is the ratio of value of shares held by institutional investors to the
value of shares outstanding.
42Table 11: Capital expenditures  and institutional ownership
Low institutional  High institutional
ownership  ownership
Q  0.002(0.34)  0.002(0.33)
Cashflow  0.059(1.42)  0.059(1.42)
Sales  0.005(0.65)  0.005(0.65)
NT  279  278
Adjusted r2 0.029  0.029
Note: Table shows  parameter estimates  from regressions with (capital  expenditures/  replacement
cost) on the left hand side, and Q, (cashflow/replacement  cost), and (sales/replacement  cost) on
the right hand side.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
43Table 12: ILnstitutional  ownership  and leverage ratios
High institutional  Low institutional
ownership  ownership
(Debt/Equity)  0.548  0.466
(Debt/Assets)  0.170  0.164
(Debt/Book  value of debt
and equity)  0.221  0.208
(Debt/Market value of debt
and equity)  0.176  0.168
NT  1276  281
Note: * indicates that the ratios are significantly  different at the I% level.
44Table 13: Institutional  ownership  and leverage regressions
I  L
Q  0.016(5.62)  0.016(5.62)
Log (Sales)  0.035(5.24)  0.038(5.68)
(Gross capital stock/
Assets)  0.345(10.19)  0.346(10.23)
(Profits/Assets)  -0.034(-1.19)  -0.033(-1.14)
Institutional ownership  -0.001(-2.85)
Adjusted r2 0.078  0.079
NT  3324  3324
Note: Institutional  ownership is the ratio of value of shares held by institutional  investors to the
value of shares outstanding.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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